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Recent commentators have examined the Howard Government’s Electoral and 
Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Act 2006, and detailed 
its democratic deficiencies and partisan nature. This is particularly evident in its 
restrictive enrolment provisions and increased threshold for public disclosure of 
donations to political parties and candidates.1 The prioritisation of partisan interests 
above democratic principles is not a new phenomenon in Australian electoral legislation. 
Since federation it has been crucial in determining the electoral laws included in the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Electoral Act), and those that are neglected.2 For 
example, in 1918, farmers’ candidates competed against candidates from the governing 
Nationalist Party in by-elections, causing the conservative vote to split two ways, and 
allowing Labor to win seats with relatively small vote shares. The Victorian Farmers’ 
Union threat to continue running candidates saw the Hughes Nationalist Government 
introduce preferential voting.3 Similarly, the Chifley Labor Government introduced 
proportional representation in the Senate in 1948 for several reasons, including an 
attempt to ensure that Labor would maintain its Senate majority after the 1949 election 
despite an anticipated poor result.4  
 
Partisan interest is not the only motivation for governments to alter electoral laws, but 
among major changes it is almost always a key factor. It should also be noted that 
governments can maintain their partisan advantage by neglecting to legislate. This has 
been particularly apparent in Australia’s weak campaign finance laws and government 
advertising restrictions. Furthermore, it must be recognised that Australian 
                                                 
1 See for example, Colin A. Hughes and Brian Costar, 2006, Limiting Democracy: The Erosion of Electoral 
Rights in Australia, Sydney, University of New South Wales Press., Marian Sawer, 2006, ‘Damaging 
Democracy?  Early Closure of Electoral Rolls’, Democratic Audit of Australia, 
http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au., Sally Young and Joo-Cheong Tham, 2006, Political Finance in 
Australia: A Skewed and Secret System, Audit Report No. 7, Canberra, Democratic Audit of Australia. 
2 For a brief yet comprehensive review of partisan interests in Australian electoral reforms up to 1983, see 
Joint Select Committee on Electoral Reform, 1983, First Report, Canberra, Australian Government 
Publishing Service. 
3 Marian Sawer, 2004, ‘Australia: Replacing Plurality Rule with Majority-Preferential Voting’, in Josep M. 
Colomer (ed.), Handbook of Electoral System Choice, especially pp. 475-480. 
4 John Uhr, ‘Why We Chose Proportional Representation’, Papers on Parliament 34, 1999, 
http://www.aph.gov.au.  
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parliamentarians are not unique in this respect; partisanship in electoral laws is a 
worldwide phenomenon.5  
 
This article examines current safeguards against partisanship in electoral legislation, and 
considers the constitutional and practical possibilities of a new system for creating non-
partisan electoral legislation in Australia. Inevitably, this idea will not receive universal 
support, but the article seeks to promote debate on the possibility of removing this 
parliamentary conflict of interest, that allows the winners of elections to subsequently 
alter the rules. 
 
Current safeguards 
The partisan nature of electoral amendments is the result of limited restrictions on 
governing parties. The most formidable restriction on Australian governments is the 
Senate, but this is only effective as a safeguard when opposition parties perform well 
enough in elections to prevent government majorities. Conventional wisdom suggested 
that governments would not control the Senate while there were 12 senators per State, as 
at half-elections, parties would require 57.3 percent of the preference vote in a State to 
receive four of the six available quotas, and thus take a majority of senate positions in a 
State.6 However, it has become relatively easy for major parties to receive three of the six 
quotas, as this requires only 42.9 percent of the vote. Thus, with an unremarkable 
performance at one election, a party could obtain half of the available Senate positions, 
and then with a particularly strong performance in one state at the next election, could 
obtain a Senate majority. 
 
This occurred in the 2004 election, when the Liberal-National Coalition, having obtained 
half of the vacancies in the 2001 election, won a majority in Queensland.7 The 
                                                 
5 Richard S. Katz, 2005, ‘Why are There so Many (or so Few) Electoral Reforms?’ in Michael Gallagher 
and Paul Mitchell (eds.) The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 57-76., 
Charles Boix, 1999, ‘Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced 
Democracies’, American Political Science Review 93 (3): 609-624. 
6 See for example Campbell Sharman, 1986, ‘The Senate, Small Parties and the Balance of Power’, Politics 
21 (2): 20-31. 
7 See Nick Economou, 2006, ‘A Right-of-Centre Triumph: The 2004 Australian Half-Senate Election’, 
Australian Journal of Political Science 41 (4): 501–16. 
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Coalition’s success relied in part on the relative strength of minor parties on the left and 
right of Australian politics. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) is presently unlikely to 
obtain a Senate majority due to the success of the Australian Greens, which will often 
take a third left-of-centre vacancy ahead of the ALP, preventing it from winning half of 
the Senate positions, let alone a majority. The current lack of a minor party with similar 
appeal among right-of-centre voters, virtually guarantees that the Coalition will obtain at 
least half of the available senate positions, allowing it to obtain a majority with a strong 
performance in one State.8 
 
The prevention of senate majorities also depends on the existence of two competitive 
major parties. If either major party weakened to the point that it was no longer able to 
approach 42.9 percent of the Senate vote, the other party would likely take a senate 
majority, and be unrestrained in its ability to legislate on electoral and other matters. 
However, the existence of these two strong major parties also guarantees senates in which 
the major parties can create or retain laws that assist them collectively at the expense of 
the minor parties. Furthermore, this two-party dominance allows the remote possibility of 
an opposition senate majority. This situation may prevent the governing party from 
redressing existing imbalances against it. This occurred in 1973–74 when the Whitlam 
Labor Government struggled to pass its bill for more equal population sizes among 
electoral divisions, eventually requiring a joint sitting of parliament to do so.9 
 
The only other safeguard against government misuse of electoral legislation is the 
committee system, specifically, the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters 
(JSCEM). This Committee has been broadly successful in providing the Australian 
Electoral Commission (AEC) with a mechanism to obtain alterations to the Electoral Act 
where it feels they are required for the smoother administration of elections, and in 
allowing the public, parliamentarians and parties to make submissions and provide 
                                                 
8 Although Tasmania and South Australia provided exceptions to this rule at the 2007 federal election, with 
each state giving four of its six vacancies to left-of-centre candidates, leaving only two for the Coalition. 
9 Gough Whitlam, 1985, The Whitlam Government, 1972–1975, Ringwood, Penguin, pp. 673–74. 
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evidence supporting alterations in electoral laws and procedures.10 However, 
governments have often ignored the evidence the JSCEM has gathered from sources 
other than government submissions. This was particularly notable in the JSCEM review 
of the 2004 Federal Election, which preceded the Howard Government’s Electoral 
Integrity Bill.11 As an example, the JSCEM recommended a ban on prisoner voting 
despite the fact that 52 submissions opposed such a ban, and only three supported it, with 
two of these coming from the Government.12 Deputy chair of the JSCEM, the ALP's 
Michael Danby displayed similar disregard for the committee evidence process. Prior to 
the 2007 election, when asked if a future Labor Government would overturn the 2006 
amendments to enrolment provisions, Danby responded, ‘Yes, as quick as we can; 
probably as a recommendation of the 2007 JSCEM report.’13 
 
The dominance of parliamentarians’ views in JSCEM matters is also evidenced by its 
reluctance to examine issues beyond those of specific interest to parliamentarians. The 
JSCEM has not attempted to understand negative public attitudes towards Australian 
politics or repair public trust in the party system, nor has it attempted to encourage 
greater public participation in politics beyond voting in elections once every three 
years.14 
 
Limiting government power within parliament 
The partisan misuse of electoral legislation could only be eradicated by reducing 
governments’ virtually untrammelled ability to legislate in its own interest. To limit this 
power through parliamentary processes would be difficult. Governments with senate 
majorities have complete legislative power within the bounds of the Constitution. The 
only way to limit such governments within parliament would be to require something 
                                                 
10 John Uhr, 2003, ‘Measuring Parliaments Against the Spence Standard’, in Graeme Orr, Bryan Mercurio 
and George Williams (eds.), Realising Democracy: Electoral Law in Australia, Sydney, The Federation 
Press, p. 76. 
11 John Warhurst, 2006, ‘When Democracy Meets Politics’, About the House, 26: 31. 
12 Norm Kelly, 2006, ‘Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Bill 
2005, Commentary for the Democratic Audit of Australia’, Democratic Audit of Australia, 
http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au, p. 3. 
13 Michael Danby, 12/9/2007, Interview conducted by the author.  
14 Uhr, ‘Measuring Parliaments Against the Spence Standard’, pp. 77–79. 
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more than a majority to pass electoral legislation. While the use of a supermajority, such 
as a two-thirds majority, is feasible and would reduce government power to legislate in 
its own interest, it would also exclude minor parties from the process. This would allow 
the major parties to legislate in their common interest on matters such as campaign 
finance and political advertising, where the major parties, which raise considerably more 
money than minor parties,15 are each favourably served by limited regulation.16 This 
measure would likely result in an unalterable two-party system, and make rapid 
legislative change difficult, no matter how necessary it may be. 
 
Limiting government power with existing bodies outside parliament 
Given the inadequacy of existing parliamentary safeguards to prevent government misuse 
of electoral legislation, the use of a body outside of parliament should be explored. Using 
an existing external body would be administratively simpler and less expensive than 
creating a new body, but no appropriate body exists. Judicial bodies such as the High 
Court should not be involved in the legislative process as they would then adjudicate on 
laws they had created. 
 
The Australian tradition of neutral and impartial bureaucratic electoral administration, 17 
suggests that the AEC may be suitable. Although it largely maintains independence from 
government ministries, the Commission does not have ‘responsibility for policy decisions 
relating to the electoral process’,18 and therefore does not meet the International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance criteria for classification as an independent 
electoral management body.19 Despite this, and government control over the 
                                                 
15 Joo-Cheong Tham, 2003/2004, ‘Money politics: Corporate contributions to political parties’, Dissent 
Summer, p. 25. 
16 Andrew Murray, 2006, ‘Guaranteed failure—it’s never the right time for funding reform’, Political 
Finance & Government Advertising Workshop, Democratic Audit of Australia, 
http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au, p. 1. 
17 Colin A. Hughes, 2001, ‘Institutionalising electoral integrity’, in Marian Sawer (ed.) Elections: Full, 
Free & Fair, Sydney, The Federation Press, p. 156. 
18 Alan Wall, Andrew Ellis, Ayman Ayoub, Carl W. Dundas, Joram Rukambe and Sara Staino, 2006, 
Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook, Stockholm, International IDEA, p. 7. 
19 Norm Kelly, ‘Australia’s Electoral Management Bodies—Degrees of Independence’, Paper presented at 
the 2007 APSA conference, Monash University, September 24–26, 2007, p. 5. 
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Commission’s finances, the AEC is not subject to widespread government interference in 
its administration of the election process.  
 
The Australian population and politicians accept AEC decisions on elections. In many 
other countries, the losing candidate and her or his supporters do not trust electoral 
administrators, and do not peacefully accept their results. Australians trust the AEC partly 
because of its non-political nature. To provide it with political responsibilities such as 
designing legislation would force it to favour the views of one or other side of politics in 
policy decisions. This would diminish the AEC’s independence and ability to conduct 
elections. 
 
The AEC also lacks the popular legitimacy of Parliament, whose members are elected. 
Electing members of the AEC for this purpose would afford legitimacy, but this would 
politicise the AEC, making it partisan rather than making electoral laws impartial, 
defeating the purpose of the reform. Thus, it appears that no existing body is capable of 
diminishing the power of governments to legislate on electoral matters, and the 
possibility of a new body must be examined. 
 
Other nations as precedents 
While Australia lacks a precedent for such a body, some newer democracies, like Costa 
Rica and Jamaica have used non-parliamentary bodies to limit government power over 
electoral legislation. While Australia usually does not seek to replicate measures 
implemented by these nations, newer democracies in less stable parts of the world often 
find urgent action necessary to safeguard their electoral procedures, resulting in highly 
advanced electoral administrations. Conversely, established democracies where civil 
disturbance is unlikely to result from a highly contested election often neglect to make 
improvements to their administrations. The United States exemplifies this with the 
confusion in Florida during the 2000 presidential election, where the decentralisation of 
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electoral administration allowed ballot papers that bewildered voters and vote counters 
alike, leaving the entire election result in doubt for weeks.20 
 
In Costa Rica, the legislature must consult the Supreme Electoral Tribunal – Costa Rica’s 
version of the AEC – on proposed electoral legislation. If the Tribunal disagrees with a 
proposed law, the bill requires a two-thirds majority of the legislative assembly rather 
than a simple majority.21 Costa Rica’s tribunal cannot design legislation, but it does 
provide a significant check on power, and prevents a single party from legislating in its 
own interest. Such a system is not ideal for Australia, as the supermajority requirement in 
the legislature would allow the major parties to control matters on which they broadly 
agree, and because it again raises the problem of involving the AEC in political decisions. 
 
From 1979 to 2006, Jamaica operated two separate electoral management bodies, the 
Electoral Office of Jamaica (EOJ), which administered elections much as the AEC does, 
and the Electoral Advisory Committee (EAC), which oversaw policy and legislation in 
electoral matters. While the EAC did include parliamentarians in its membership, these 
did not have voting rights, so it was effectively a non-parliamentary body. Despite its 
advantages, Jamaica always considered this two-bodied approach to be an interim 
measure, and in late 2006, the EAC and EOJ merged, forming the Electoral Commission 
of Jamaica. 
 
Before the merger, the EAC functioned to protect ‘the electoral process from the 
immediate direction, influence and control of the Government, which may influence its 
functioning to the detriment of persons with opposing views’.22 While the 1979 
Representation of the People (Interim Reform) Act that created the EAC did not 
explicitly provide it with power over electoral legislation,23 a convention emerged under 
                                                 
20 See Alan Agresti and Brett Presnell, 2002, ‘Misvotes, Undervotes and Overvotes: The 2000 Presidential 
Election in Florida’, Statistical Science 17 (4): 436–40. 
21 Ruben Hernandez Valle, 2006, ‘Case Study: Costa Rica’, in Wall et al, Electoral Management Design: 
The International IDEA Handbook, p. 77. 
22 Electoral Office of Jamaica, www.eoj.com.jm/eac/index.htm.  
23 Representation of the People (Interim Electoral Reform) Act, 1979, www.moj.gov.jm.  
 9
which parliament passed the Committee’s unanimous decisions without debate.24 This 
could involve alterations to the various acts governing electoral matters.  
 
Recently, this convention has been ignored. In June 2007, the Jamaican Senate amended 
bills proposed by the new electoral commission. Director of Elections, Danville Walker 
repudiated this breach of the convention, but Attorney-General, Senator A.J. Nicholson 
argued that as the supreme legislative body, parliament was entitled to effect whatever 
amendments it chose.25 This elucidates the need for statutory protection of such a body’s 
legislative function. 
 
Parliamentary supremacy in Australia 
To replicate the Jamaican system would provide no legal difficulties in Australia, as the 
EAC was only an advisory committee; it was convention that saw its recommendations 
accepted without debate. The situation is less clear when such a body is to have statutory 
protection for it legislative functions. This raises the important issue of parliamentary 
supremacy. 
 
Australia’s parliament is supreme rather than sovereign. A sovereign parliament is 
subject to no limitations on its exercise of legislative power, whereas a supreme 
parliament holds a claim to legislative authority superior to that of any other institution 
but may be subject to legal limitation, such as through judicial review by a high court.26 It 
is possible to maintain parliament’s superior claim to legislative authority by setting up 
an independent body to design electoral legislation as long as parliament establishes it 
and retains the ability to abolish it.  
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Electoral Advisory Committee, 1998, Report to Parliament on Electoral Reform 10 November 1998, 
http://www.eoj.com.jm.  
25 Jamaica Gleaner, 2007, ‘Commission to respond to new electoral bills’, http://www.jamaica-
gleaner.com.  
26 David Kinley, 1994, ‘Constitutional Brokerage in Australia: Constitutions and the Doctrines of 
Parliamentary Supremacy and the Rule of Law’, Political Theory Newsletter 6 (1), p. 54. 
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Delegated legislation and the constitution 
Many Australians would be surprised to learn that the process of parliament delegating 
legislative authority to other bodies is common, with delegated legislation accounting for 
almost 2000 legislative instruments enacted per year.27 Parliament allocates legislative 
power over specific areas to each of these bodies. Usually, this comprises laws below 
statute level such as regulations and ordinances, but parliament has delegated the power 
to amend acts on several occasions. It was common practice during wartime, with the 
Governor-General often delegated power to amend acts such as the Re-establishment and 
Employment Act 1945.28  
 
The power of parliament to delegate legislative authority is constitutionally very broad. 
This was examined by the High Court in Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting 
Co Pty Ltd v Dignan Informant, Dixon J considered that as parliament could repeal the 
enabling statute, thus preventing all delegation of legislation, it would still hold ultimate 
control over any legislation delegated no matter how broad the power given.29 Evatt J 
believed the restrictions were slightly stronger, stating, ‘the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth is not competent to “abdicate” its powers of legislation.’  Not because 
parliament must perform its legislative powers or functions, and not because the 
separation of powers prevents parliament from granting authority to other bodies, but 
because the Commonwealth may only legislate on the specific areas delineated by the 
constitution. The constitution does not specifically permit the parliament to give away all 
of its legislative power, so it cannot do so.30  
 
Parliament certainly has power to delegate legislative power for electoral matters. The 
Constitution uses the phrase ‘until parliament otherwise provides’ for most electoral 
provisions contained within it, conferring sweeping legislative power to parliament, 
which it can then delegate elsewhere if it so desires. Only a handful of constitutional 
                                                 
27 Dennis Pearce, 2004, ‘Rules, Regulations and Red Tape: Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated 
Legislation’, Papers on Parliament, 42, p. 86. 
28 Dennis Pearce, 1977, Delegated Legislation in Australia and New Zealand, Sydney, Butterworths, p. 7. 
29 Owen Dixon J, 1931, in Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan Informant, 
HCA 34, 46 CLR 73. 
30 Herbert Vere Evatt J, 1931, in Dignan. 
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restrictions apply, such as that at s24, which requires that the members of the House of 
Representatives be chosen directly by the people.31 The dispute that remains after Dignan 
is over how much power Parliament may cede to other bodies. For Evatt J, no law may 
have as its sole purpose the delegation of legislative power over a given subject; it must 
also be a law with respect to that subject.32 Conversely, for Dixon J, a law delegating 
legislative power over a subject constitutionally afforded to Parliament, is a law with 
respect to that subject.33 
 
The delegated legislation process 
For Dixon, parliament retains its supremacy as long as it has the power to repeal the Act 
allowing delegated legislation, but for many, this allows an uncomfortable amount of 
power to pass to bodies that were not created to design laws.34 Such bodies lack the 
legitimacy to exercise this power as they were neither elected nor designed to do so. 
Thus, parliament maintains a system to oversee delegated legislation. 
 
The process for parliamentary oversight of delegated legislation under the Legislative 
Instruments Act 2003 includes the tabling of all legislative instruments in each house of 
parliament within six sitting days of the registration of the instrument.35 This can 
occasion a significant delay if the legislation is created at a time when parliament is not in 
session. During this time, the legislation is in force, thus the parliament’s ability to 
disallow delegated legislation is in fact an ability to repeal it.36 A disallowance motion 
takes little effort to succeed. Within 15 sitting days of a legislative instrument’s tabling, 
any parliamentarian can give notice of a motion to disallow the instrument. For the 
instrument to survive, the Parliament must actively reject the disallowance motion within 
                                                 
31 Gerard Carney, 2003, ‘The High Court and the Constitutionalism of Electoral Law’, in Graeme Orr, 
Bryan Mercurio and George Williams, Realising Democracy: Election Law in Australia, Leichardt, The 
Federation Press, pp. 174–75. 
32 Evatt J in Dignan. 
33 Dixon J in Dignan. 
34 Administrative Review Council, 1992, Report to the Attorney General: Rule Making by Commonwealth 
Agencies, Report no. 35, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, p. 5. 
35 Legislative Instruments Act 2003, s38 (1) 
36 Pearce, ‘Rules, Regulations and Red Tape: Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation’, p. 84. 
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another 15 sitting days of the notice. If it either votes to disallow the instrument, or does 
not resolve the disallowance motion at all, then the law is repealed.  
 
The Senate Regulations and Ordinances Committee is also crucial to the parliamentary 
review of delegated legislation. It considers four principles: whether the delegated 
legislation is made in accordance with the statute and is within the authority given to the 
delegate, whether it trespasses on personal rights and liberties, whether it makes rights 
dependent upon administrative decisions that are not subject to independent review and 
whether the delegated legislation contains matters more appropriate for parliamentary 
enactment.37 For our purposes, it is this last principle that is the most important. Under 
the guidelines the Committee uses, it would potentially consider that delegated legislation 
on electoral matters such as campaign finance provisions ‘fundamentally changes the 
law’,38 and therefore determine that it is more appropriate for parliamentary 
consideration.  
 
However, judgments of what is appropriate for parliamentary action should also consider 
the potential for conflict of interest in matters such as parliamentary allowances – 
presently delegated to the Australian Government Remunerations Tribunal39 – and 
electoral matters. While parliamentarians’ ability to gain personally from travel 
allowances and other such benefits is an easier link to draw, many sitting members will 
feel that alterations to electoral laws threaten their seats. This seems to be a far greater 
conflict of interest; most parliamentarians would be more interested in keeping their seats 
than their travel allowances. This explains why partisan bias has been so evident in 
electoral legislation and suggests that electoral legislation is not more appropriate for 
parliamentary consideration. 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Senate Regulations and Ordinances Committee, Guidelines on the Committee’s application of its 
Principles, http://www.aph.gov.au. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Australian Government Remunerations Tribunal, http://www.remtribunal.gov.au.  
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Proposal for an independent electoral law committee 
So how could a non-partisan body responsible for electoral law be established? An 
independent electoral law committee (the Committee) would be introduced by statute, 
allowing parliament to retain the ability to abolish the Committee, and thereby maintain 
its supremacy over legislative authority. Parliament would delegate its legislative power 
over electoral matters to the Committee. The independence of the Committee should be 
encouraged by guaranteeing it a certain percentage of the budget, rather than having 
major parties seek its favour with financial promises. Although parliament could abolish 
or curtail the Committee’s powers, this would be a politically difficult step, as it would 
likely provoke public discontent. 
 
The complete delegation of electoral matters would potentially be subject to a High Court 
challenge. While Dixon’s J judgment from Dignan would support it, Evatt’s J 
requirement that a law delegating legislative power also be a law regarding the delegated 
subject may not. Although Dixon J allows parliament to apportion legislative power to 
other bodies as long as it retains the ability to repeal the act that delegated power, the 
Dignan ruling did not concern an example in which parliament removed its own power to 
repeal delegated legislation. This provision although not unique appears to be untested in 
Australia. 
 
Appointments 
The Committee would consist of seven members. A parliamentary committee such as the 
JSCEM should nominate potential Committee members to parliament, allowing detailed 
scrutiny of each nominee. A two-thirds majority in each house of parliament must 
approve appointees to the Committee, preventing a government from dominating 
appointments, and conferring legitimacy indirectly through the Parliament. Legitimacy is 
enhanced by the fact that the body is designed to consider legislation and its members are 
appointed by parliament, which considers appointees competence to perform the 
legislative function.  
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The use of such a supermajority would have the drawback of disadvantaging minor 
parties and independents, whose votes would usually be irrelevant in determining the 
membership of the Committee, potentially allowing the major parties to ensure that 
appointed members broadly support major parties. However, the non-partisan nature of 
the Committee should ensure that it considers minor party interests in its determinations.  
 
Members of the Committee should have a four-year term. This is slightly longer than one 
electoral cycle, allowing each member to review one election, but keeping their tenure 
short enough that individual members’ do not maintain strong influence over electoral 
matters for long periods. Members should not be reappointed, as this would allow 
parliamentarians to reward certain members for favourable law making. For this reason, 
parliament should not be able to dismiss individual members either. 
 
The decision-making procedure 
The Committee should receive submissions and evidence from the public, 
parliamentarians, parties and the AEC much as the current JSCEM does, and use this as 
the basis for determining any amendments it creates. To ensure public confidence, the 
highest standards of transparency must apply. All submissions must be publicly available, 
as must all transcripts of evidence sessions. Again, this is currently standard practice for 
the JSCEM. All alterations to the law should be accompanied by a majority report 
explaining why a particular amendment has been created, while dissenting members 
could choose to issue minority reports. Similarly, the Committee should explain decisions 
not to alter a law. While minority reports may provide ammunition to those who wish to 
oppose legislative decisions, this would be preferable to a potentially scandalous situation 
in which a Committee member’s opposition was publicised through a press leak.  
 
An absolute majority—that is, four votes out of seven—should be sufficient for the 
Committee to approve an amendment. Requirements of unanimity or a supermajority 
would potentially create difficulties if urgent reforms were needed in a contentious area. 
While some may consider a vote of four to three insufficient for creating legislation, the 
supermajority requirement for appointments is likely to produce a conservative, centrist 
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Committee, meaning that radical decisions are highly unlikely even with only an absolute 
majority requirement. 
 
Unlike most other delegated legislation, parliament should not be able to use the 
disallowance procedure. If disallowance were possible by a majority, it would allow 
governments to prevent changes to laws that did not suit them. If it were possible by 
supermajority, it would allow the two major parties to prevent any legislation that was 
not in their joint interest. Section 44 of the Legislative Instruments Act distinguishes 44 
specific instruments that are not subject to parliamentary disallowance.40 Although most 
of these are specific, relating to laws made under certain sections and subsections of an 
act, it shows that the procedure is already in place to bypass the parliamentary 
disallowance system.  
 
Parliament must confine the Committee’s legislative power to electoral matters. This 
would restrict it almost exclusively to measures within the Electoral Act, although other 
specific measures that fall outside the Act but are of electoral significance could be 
delegated to the Committee on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The Committee would make its final determination on the electoral law long before each 
election, allowing the public sufficient time to understand changes. Australia’s lack of a 
fixed election date presents a complication, but an appropriate solution would be to give 
the Committee a maximum of two years after each election to change the law for the next 
elections. After this time, the Committee would continue examining future reforms, but 
could only implement laws as an emergency provision if authorised by two-thirds of 
Parliament. 
 
Committee accountability 
One option for maintaining Committee accountability would be to give it a charter of the 
values that it is expected to uphold in delivering electoral law. This would provide a 
judicially reviewable set of guidelines that the Committee could not ignore, for fear that 
                                                 
40 Legislative Instruments Act 2003, s44 (2). 
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its laws would be considered invalid. Such an approach would prevent major abuses of 
legislative power. 
 
Creating such a charter would be difficult. Allowing parliament to devise it would likely 
see the governing party’s values dominate. It is unlikely that both major parties would be 
willing to accept a common view on a number of issues, such as the priorities for 
electoral roll management, with Labor consistently demanding greater openness of the 
roll, and ease of enrolment, while the Coalition argues for greater roll integrity, and 
preventing fraudulent enrolments. These two views are often incompatible, as measures 
to prevent fraudulent enrolment generally make enrolling more difficult. A community-
designed charter would be more able to achieve bi-partisan support, and would allow the 
public an opportunity to discuss the proposed Committee. A Royal Commission similar 
to that in New Zealand in 1986 which, in its investigation of that nation’s electoral 
system, took public submissions and held public meetings would seem appropriate.41 
 
Another accountability issue is that of the Committee’s processes. As a non-
parliamentary body, the Committee must be subject to administrative law review. This 
would not cover its final determinations, as delegated legislation itself is exempt from 
such review.42 However, administrative decisions of the Committee, such as its decisions 
on whether to hold hearings, and its consultation methods would need to accord with the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. Broadly, this Act would require the 
Committee to abide by the provisions of the Act that creates it, and abide by rules of 
natural justice,43 such as affording potentially aggrieved citizens the opportunity to put 
their case, being free from bias in its decisions and providing evidence for its decisions. 
The procedures of the Committee already discussed should be adequate to ensure that the 
Committee meets its administrative obligations, but the possibility of the major parties 
using their wealth to mount frequent legal challenges to administrative matters when they 
dislike decisions must be acknowledged. The negative effect of this can be minimised by 
                                                 
41 Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, 1986, Towards a Better Democracy,  
42 Robin Creyke and John McMillan, 2005, Control of Government Action: Text, Cases and Commentary, 
Chatswood, LexisNexis Butterworths, p. 269. 
43 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, especially s5. 
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using the Act that creates the Committee to specify committee procedure for 
administrative decisions. 
 
Conclusion 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty for such a system is winning the parliamentary approval to 
initiate it. It is almost paradoxical that a government which engages in partisan bias in 
electoral matters would then decide to delegate electoral legislation to an independent 
body. There are probably only two reasons that a government would do this. The first 
would require a massive popular outcry, pressuring the government to accept such a 
measure. This is extremely unlikely given the limited public reaction to the Howard 
Government’s 2006 amendments. Furthermore, even the most scandalously biased 
legislation would probably only result in a public determination to vote the perpetrators 
out, rather than a popular movement for the reduction of parliamentary power.  
 
The second reason for a government to introduce such a measure would be that it 
perceives some partisan advantage in it. This may mean that it stands to gain in terms of 
votes from the measure, or that it is likely to limit expected electoral damage through the 
introduction of the measure. This would require some level of popular support for the 
change, but it would not have to be as widespread as in the first scenario, and a campaign 
to limit the power of parliamentarians is likely to find some favour amongst Australians. 
Recent experience of major changes in electoral laws in other nations shows that royal 
commissions have helped to create and foster public momentum.44 
 
The Constitutional uncertainty in the creation of this system should not be seen as a 
discouraging factor. A High Court challenge should be welcomed, as it would clarify the 
standing of this system and the limits of legislative power in Australia. While the system 
may be found to overreach the bounds of the Constitution, a similar system delegating 
effective legislative power over more limited areas such as campaign finance or political 
                                                 
44 See for example the New Zealand experience in introducing mixed-member proportional voting in 1993, 
Jack H. Nagel, 2004, ‘New Zealand: Reform by (Nearly) Immaculate Design’, in Colomer, Handbook of 
Electoral System Choice, pp. 475–86, and Canada’s strict electoral reforms after the Gomery Royal 
Commission, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Finance, 1991, Reforming Electoral 
Democracy, Minister of Supply and Services Canada. 
 18
advertising may be acceptable. This would still remove a parliamentary conflict of 
interest and allow legislation in these areas to improve. 
 
The need for the Independent Electoral Law Committee arises from governing parties’ 
consistent misuse of electoral legislation for partisan advantage, and the lack of adequate 
safeguards against this practice. While there is no such thing as an impartial electoral 
system,45 and Committee determinations would reflect the values of its members, this 
procedure would nevertheless encourage fair electoral competition by preventing one side 
from skewing the electoral system to its own advantage. In addition, this system would 
allow citizens to have greater faith in parliamentarians and the electoral process, as the 
difficulties of conflicts of interest in electoral matters would essentially be eradicated. 
This proposal is unorthodox, and as such, will attract criticism, but its advantages for fair 
electoral competition would be extensive.  
                                                 
45 See for example Gerard Newman and Scott Bennett, 2005-06, ‘Electoral Systems’, Parliamentary 
Library Research Brief 10, http://www.aph.gov.au. 
